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Japan’s economy has experienced an extremely large swing against
the backdrop of the emergence, expansion, and bursting of asset
price bubbles. When examining the emergence and bursting of 
the bubble economy from the viewpoint of monetary policy man-
agement, should the Bank of Japan have given more consideration 
to asset price fluctuations in formulating its monetary policy? 
Or, should the Bank not have been perplexed with asset price 
fluctuations and conducted policies focusing only on the general
price level such as inflation targeting? In answering these questions
and deciding policy actions, to what extent should the Bank 
consider financial system problems? This paper aims at forming
some tentative answers to these questions.
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Financial stabilityI. Introduction
Since the latter half of the 1980s, Japan’s economy has experienced an extremely large
swing against the backdrop of the emergence, expansion, and bursting of asset price
bubbles. When looking back at the emergence, expansion, and bursting of asset price
bubbles from the viewpoint of monetary policy management, should the Bank of
Japan (hereafter, BOJ) have given more consideration to asset price fluctuations in
formulating its monetary policy? Or should the BOJ not have been perplexed with
asset price fluctuations and conducted policies focusing only on the general price
level such as inflation targeting?
In general, if asset prices are at levels consistent with economic fundamentals,
then various assets are most effectively utilized in a way consistent with real economic
activity, and thus asset price fluctuations will not be a serious problem in monetary
policy management. However, asset prices can, for various reasons, diverge from 
economic fundamentals and form a so-called bubble. In some cases, a bubble will
emerge due to excessive optimism with respect to fundamentals. Such optimistic
expectations will sooner or later be betrayed. In other cases, while market participants
recognize excess in asset prices compared with economic fundamentals, they might
continue bullish investment thinking that such excess will continue. But in such
cases, it is impossible that such rises in asset prices can be sustained forever beyond
levels consistent with economic fundamentals. Therefore, when asset prices contain
an element of a bubble, there will inevitably be, sooner or later, a correction. 
A rise and fall in asset prices, which contain an element of a bubble, affect real
economic activity mainly through the following routes: (1) on consumption through
the wealth effect, and (2) on investment through a change in external finance 
premium due to changes in collateral and net asset values.
1 Therefore, when asset
prices are rising, they affect the economy in a favorable way even though such a rise is
occasioned by a bubble and the adverse effects are not thoroughly recognized.
However, once the economy enters a downturn, the above favorable cycle reverses.
In particular, when a favorable cycle has been occasioned by a bubble, the economy
will face a severe reaction. That is, the harmful effects of a bubble will emerge, exert-
ing stress on the real side of the economy and financial system due to an unexpected
correction of asset prices. In such a case, if intensified bullish expectations that 
previously supported the bubble are left unchecked, expansion and subsequent 
bursting of the bubble will become bigger, affecting the real economy directly or, by
damaging the financial system, indirectly. In light of Japan’s experience, it seems to be
a characteristic that effects of a bubble are asymmetrically larger in the bursting
period than in the expansion period. 
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1. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) explain that frictions in financial markets, such as imperfect information and costly
enforcement of contracts, generate a difference in costs between external funds such as bond financing, and inter-
nal funds such as retaining earnings. They call the above wedge the external finance premium, and emphasize that
the external finance premium fluctuates coincidentally with business cycles, thereby propagating the conventional
effect of interest rates on aggregate demand.When looking back at the experience during the asset price bubble in the 
late 1980s, the rate of inflation shown in statistics was relatively moderate, but 
expectations that low interest rates would continue over time had been generated in
the meantime, making economic agents’ expectations extremely bullish with respect
to the future.
2 What should be noted about the asset price bubble in Japan is that 
it is not a rational bubble as modeled in Blanchard and Watson (1982), which 
is expressed as a divergence from economic fundamentals and whose probability 
of bursting is recognized among economic agents and thus incorporated into 
asset price formation. Rather, it is characterized by euphoria, that is, excessively 
optimistic expectations with respect to future economic fundamentals, which 
lasted for several years and then burst. Therefore, during the bubble period 
Japan faced difficulty in evaluating ex ante whether it was the arrival of a new era or
simply euphoria.
3
In general, a stable financial system and macroeconomic environment are regarded
as a necessary condition for enhancing economic stability and efficiency.
4 Hence, in
light of Japan’s experience, it seems extremely important to accurately analyze what
asset price fluctuations imply and to accurately evaluate how “expectations” illustrated
in such fluctuations are sustainable.
5
This paper is composed as follows. Section II summarizes the characteristics of
asset price bubbles in the late 1980s based on Japan’s historical experience of asset
price inflation in the postwar period. Section III verifies the relationship between
monetary policy management and asset prices in the process of the emergence of the
bubble based on a standard view of policy rules. In Section IV, after summarizing 
the effects of the bursting of the bubble on financial system stability, the impact on
monetary policy is considered, and Section V rounds up the discussion and presents 
a conclusion. The appendices summarize Japan’s experience with respect to (1) the
relationship between the emergence and bursting of asset price bubbles and structural
problems, and implications for monetary policy management; and (2) the fact that
the border of monetary policy and prudential policy becomes extremely blurred
when the financial system is in a critical condition. 
II. Japan’s Asset Price Bubble since the Late 1980s
In this section, we summarize the characteristics of asset price bubbles in the 
late 1980s, based on Japan’s historical experience of asset price inflation in the 
postwar period.
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2. Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) examine this point in detail.
3. If an increase in asset prices is caused by a rational bubble, evaluation on economic fundamentals will remain
unchanged, and thus existence of the bubble will not affect assessment on an output gap. On the contrary, since
euphoria cannot be generated independent of a recognition that economic fundamentals have shifted upward,
assessments on economic fundamentals and an output gap are inevitably two sides of one coin. Such difference
between a rational bubble and euphoria is crucially important in considering the implications of the asset price
hikes on the monetary policy management. 
4. See Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001), and Shiratsuka (2001a).
5. See Shiratsuka (2001b, c).A. Japan’s Asset Price Bubbles in the Post-WWII Period
Let us review the major characteristics of the emergence and bursting of Japan’s asset
price bubble.
6 Figure 1 plots major financial and economic indicators, including 
asset prices such as stock and land prices. The figure plots stock prices and land
prices as indicators for asset prices (upper panel), the consumer price index (CPI), the
domestic wholesale price index, and the GDP deflator as indicators of the general
price level (second upper panel), the growth rate of real GDP, and unemployment
rate as indicators for demand-supply conditions (second lower panel), and M2+CDs
and nominal GDP (lower panel). This figure shows the three major boom-bust cycles
in asset prices: (1) the Iwato boom in the second half of the 1950s; (2) from the
boom arising from Prime Minister Tanaka’s “remodeling the Japanese archipelago”
project to the first oil crisis; and (3) the Heisei boom in the late 1980s to early 1990s. 
First, at the time of the Iwato boom, while investment demand due to technologi-
cal innovation replaced post-World War II reconstruction demand as the main driver
and ushered in the high-economic growth period, asset prices increased rapidly and,
on the price front, consumer prices rose while wholesale prices remained generally
stable, thus leading to “productivity difference inflation.” However, the real economic
growth rate exceeded 10 percent per annum, and the increase in asset prices mainly
reflected an improvement in fundamentals due to technological innovation.
Second, during the period from the “remodeling the Japanese archipelago”
7 boom
to the first oil crisis, asset prices first increased and then the general price level sharply
increased due to the excessively high growth of money stock and oil price hikes 
stemming from the first oil crisis, while real economic growth rapidly declined, 
marking an end to the high economic growth period. 
Third and finally, in the Heisei boom, asset prices increased dramatically under
long-lasting economic growth and stable inflation, a period that is frequently referred
to as the “bubble era.” The phenomena particular to this period were stable CPI
inflation parallel with the expansion of asset prices and the long adjustment period
after the peaking of asset prices. Asset prices skyrocketed during the bubble era but
then declined rapidly from their peaks at the period from end-1989 to 1990, and
land prices continued declining while stock prices remained stagnant with unstable
fluctuation. In the meantime, real GDP growth was generally flat with temporary
fluctuations, and the growth of money stock in M2+CDs declined rapidly, from the
latest peak of 11.7 percent in 1990 to 0.6 percent in 1992. Although the growth of
money stock was stable thereafter, it was lower than that in the 1980s. However,
nominal GDP growth was lower than that of M2+CDs, thus the velocity of money,
defined as money stock divided by nominal GDP, continued to fall, as shown 
in Figure 2.
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6. This subsection extends the analysis in section 1 of Shiratsuka (2001b).
7. Kakuei Tanaka, who became prime minister in 1972, effected extremely aggressive public investment based on his
belief (remodeling the Japanese archipelago) that it was necessary to resolve overpopulation and depopulation
problems by constructing a nationwide Shinkansen railroad network, which led to an overheated economy.39
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Figure 1  Asset Prices, General Prices, and Economic Environment
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Notes: 1. Urban land price index denotes figures for commercial land in six major
cities.
2. Regarding the CPI before 1970 and the domestic WPI before 1960, the
prewar base series is connected with the current series.
3. Unemployment rate is seasonally adjusted.
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly; Japan Real
Estate Institute, Urban Land Price Index; Ministry of Public Management,
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Consumer Price Index,
Labor Force Survey; Cabinet Office, National Accounts.B. Emergence and Bursting of Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy
From the viewpoint of the relationship between soaring asset prices and monetary 
policy, there is much literature that points out the failure of monetary policy during
the early 1970s and late 1980s. During the process in which bullish expectations were
formed, stemming from the “Japanese archipelago remodeling” boom in the case of 
the former period and the virtuous circle induced by the emergence of the bubble
economy in the latter period, euphoric optimism about the economic outlook 
prevailed. On the monetary policy front, in the early 1970s, monetary easing—
effected in response to concerns over a possible deflationary shock induced by the 
collapse of the fixed foreign exchange rate regime of ¥360 per U.S. dollar—accelerated
inflation by way of providing excess liquidity. In both cases, it cannot be denied that
monetary policy at the time did, in a sense, support euphoria. In the late 1980s, 
continuing monetary easing under international policy coordination for the sake of
correcting the external imbalance led to expectations of protracted low interest rates. 
However, in the process of subsequent tightening and easing, the 1990s faced 
a longer and more serious economic stagnation than in the 1970s. From this 
viewpoint, it seems that the bursting of asset price bubbles in the 1990s not only
amplified swings in the business cycle but—more so than the 1970s, which experi-
enced the oil shocks—also triggered a substantial and permanent reduction in Japan’s
potential economic growth rate.
In addition, the bursting of the bubble steadily eroded the basis for Japan’s 
economic growth during the 1990s, and a characteristic of Japan’s financial system
founded mainly on bank-based finance further worsened the situation. Since such
adverse effects do not materialize until a certain threshold is reached under bank-
based financial systems, this prevented economic agents from recognizing that the
shock stemming from the bursting of the bubble would have a prolonged impact,
and made it difficult to pursue drastic resolution of financial system problems. 
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Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly; Cabinet Office,
National Accounts.As such, by taking more than 10 years, the enormous fluctuation in asset prices 
gradually led to the deterioration of Japan’s economy in various ways, forcing it to the
brink of a deflationary spiral, and made the conduct of monetary policy extremely
difficult for the central bank.
Of course, many structural problems inherent in Japan’s economy, which had
been pointed out since the 1970s and 1980s, had surfaced in the 1990s.
8 In addition,
the emergence and bursting of the bubble delayed such structural problems from
materializing, thus postponing action to cope with the problems and amplifying 
the difficulties.
However, even though the principal reasons for prolonged economic stagnation
were the various structural problems faced by Japan’s economy, and the emergence of
a bubble could not be prevented by monetary policy alone, it is an undeniable fact
that monetary policy failed to prevent large fluctuations in asset prices or ensure 
sustained stability of the financial and economic environment. As will be mentioned
later, an important feature of Japan’s experience seems to be that the large fluctuation
in asset prices induced serious financial distress rather than the central bank over-
looked the fact that asset price fluctuations precede price fluctuations. This does not
necessarily suggest that there was a factor more important for a central bank than
price stability, its first mandate. From the viewpoint of price stability, what happened
in Japan was that since effects of asset price fluctuations on the financial system had
been undervalued, such a stance resulted in a situation where prices were stable 
during the bubble period but were not stable when the bubble burst, which exposed
the economy to severe deflationary pressure.
9
III. Monetary Policy and Asset Prices during the Emergence 
and Bursting of the Bubble
Japan’s stagnant economy in the 1990s is conspicuous, and against such a backdrop
the BOJ’s monetary policy during the period has often been criticized. However,
some sort of objective benchmark becomes necessary to evaluate such criticisms. In
this regard, what is most interesting is a verification of Japan’s monetary policy based
on the Taylor rule and its variant.
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8. Recognized as structural problems in Japan are (1) erosion of financial institutions’ balance sheets resulting from
the generation and bursting of the bubble, (2) inefficient non-tradable goods industries, (3) a corporate manage-
ment system that is incompatible with change, and (4) a savings-investment imbalance (excess savings due to
demographic factors and other reasons). These problems (except [1]) did not emerge in the 1990s, though many
had already been recognized and action called for since the 1980s and, as early as the 1970s with respect to
improving productivity and the delayed exit of industries. Maeda, Higo, and Nishizaki (2001) provide the detailed
analysis on the structural problems in Japan. See also Appendix 1 for discussion on the relationship between the
resolution of structural problems and monetary policy.
9. With respect to price stability as an objective of monetary policy, Shiratsuka (2001a) elaborates on concepts of
“measured price stability” and “sustainable price stability.” Measured price stability expresses price stability in
numerical terms to set a tolerable target range for the inflation rate, such that “price stability corresponds to a 
rate of inflation from zero to 2 percent.” On the other hand, sustainable price stability emphasizes the importance
of achieving a stable macroeconomic environment as a fundamental condition for sustainable growth, rather 
than merely pursuing measured price stability in terms of a particular price index. Taking account of effects 
on the financial system, asset prices will be included in such an environment depending on the structure of the
financial system.A. Evaluation of Monetary Policy Based on the Policy Rule
In order to achieve sustainable price stability, how should a central bank respond to
an asset price rise?
10 The prevailing consensus among economists and central bankers
is that monetary policy should not directly target asset prices, but should respond 
to the effects of asset price fluctuations on real economic activity and inflation.
11 In
this regard, research by Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) deserves attention. This
is because Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that “central banks can and should 
treat price stability and financial stability as consistent and mutually reinforcing
objectives” by adopting a strategy of “flexible inflation targeting.”
12
Let us examine such a strategy according to the Taylor rule, which has been
widely used as a central bank’s policy reaction function. We would like to emphasize
that the following analysis aims at examining the role of asset prices in monetary 
policy management in line with Japan’s experience by using the Taylor rule as a
benchmark. Therefore, we do not discuss what policy rule would have been desirable
by comparing the Taylor rule with other rules, such as the McCallum rule or 
nominal GDP targeting, with stochastic simulation analysis in a macroeconomic
model in terms of the optimality and robustness of such rules.
13 We selected the
Taylor rule as a benchmark because it is currently the most popular policy reaction
function and there is abundant literature such as Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001)
dealing with it in relation to the role of asset prices in policy formulation. 
In the most basic formulation, the Taylor rule considers that the operational 
target level of the interest rate should be determined according to the divergence of
the inflation rate and output gap from their equilibrium level (Taylor [1993]).
Specifically, the rule can be expressed as
it = i – + β (π t – π
*) + γ (yt – yt
*), (1)
where it denotes nominal interest rate (operational target interest rate of a central
bank) at period t,  i – the nominal interest rate at long-run equilibrium, π t the 
inflation rate at period t, π
* a target inflation rate, yt the output gap at period t, and
yt
* the equilibrium level of the output gap.
The standard interpretation of the Taylor rule is that a central bank has two
objectives on the level of economic activity, inflation and the output gap, whose 
relative importance is evaluated by the coefficients of each objective variable.
However, if we regard the output gap as a proxy of future inflationary pressure, 
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10. This subsection draws on section 3 of Shiratsuka (2001b).
11. For example, Crockett (1998) states that “the prevailing consensus is that monetary policy should not target asset
prices in any direct fashion but should rather focus on achieving price stability in goods markets and creating
financial systems strong enough to survive asset price instability.”
12. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) further argue that “[by] focusing on the inflationary or deflationary pressures 
generated by asset price movements, a central bank can effectively respond to the toxic side effects of asset booms
and busts without getting into the business of deciding what is fundamental and what is not.” We will discuss
this point in the following.
13. Needless to say, any superior policy rule cannot be a panacea. In Taylor (1999), while he admits the effectiveness
of an analysis based on a macroeconomic model, he regards financial economic theory as not perfectly reliable in
guiding future monetary policy and emphasizes that historical analysis such as case studies of past episodes is also
useful, and thus proposes complementary use of both analyses.the Taylor rule can be interpreted as a rule that responds to current and future 
price developments.
14
In this case, asset price fluctuations work as inflationary/deflationary pressures 
by affecting the output gap through (1) wealth effects on expenditure activities, and
(2) the effect of changes in the external finance premium on investment activities. 
In view of the Taylor-type policy reaction function, asset price fluctuations can be
incorporated into the monetary policy response in two ways. First, because effects 
of asset price fluctuations are included in changes in the current output gap, 
guiding short-term nominal interest rates in line with the Taylor rule will enable 
a central bank to deal with potential inflationary pressure in a preemptive manner.
Second, a standard Taylor-type rule should be extended to incorporate asset price
information directly. 
B. Reexamining Monetary Policy during the Period When the Bubble Emerged
Bearing in mind the above, let us reexamine typical criticisms of Japan’s monetary
policy during the period since the latter half of the 1980s.
1. Criticism of Japan’s monetary policy
A typical criticism against Japan’s monetary policy based on the policy rule discussion
can be found in McCallum (2001), whose estimates of the targeted values of the 
policy interest rate based on the Taylor rule are shown in Figure 3. The main point of
his criticism is that monetary policy had been consistently too tight since 1993.
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14. For example, Meyer (2000) states that the Taylor rule depends on two objectives of a central bank, inflation 
and the output gap, as well as incorporates a preemptive element in the sense that the output gap is a leading
indicator of inflation. In addition, interpreting the inflation rate and the output gap as variables in the Taylor
rule, Goodhart (1999) states that these two variables are core variables in forecasting future inflation.
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Source: McCallum (2001).However, when looking at the period of expansion of the bubble, the policy rule used
by McCallum suggests interest rates would decline in 1987, and after the bursting of
the bubble the policy reversal toward monetary easing would be lagging compared
with actual policy. Such a lagged tendency is commonly observed in Taylor’s own
estimate of the Taylor rule as shown in Figure 4 (Taylor [2001]).
However, such results do not accord with the general criticism of the BOJ with
respect to its policy management during the bubble period: the protracted period of
excessive monetary easing, and delay in lifting monetary tightening after the bursting
of the bubble. What does this signify? One standpoint is to say that the BOJ should
have focused more on asset prices.
15 In fact, taking account of rises in asset prices such
as stocks and land, it was difficult to reduce policy interest rates during the period
from 1987 to 1988, and, since stock prices peaked in 1989 and subsequently
declined rapidly in 1990—some 40 percent compared with the previous year—if
stock prices were considered as a policy target or information variable, they would
have strongly urged a reduction in interest rates. When one considers the policy rule
from such a standpoint, it will be interpreted that the BOJ should have made policy
changes by adding asset price fluctuations to policy rate changes suggested by the
Taylor rule.
16
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15. Another standpoint is to insist that there are problems with the Taylor rule itself. McCallum (2001) also presents
results obtained by the McCallum rule that utilize base money, but comparison between other policy rules and
the Taylor rule goes beyond the main topic of this paper.
16. However, information content of asset prices is not necessarily high in terms of forecasting the rates of inflation
and real GDP growth. Asset prices are more informative during the bubble expansion period than the bursting
period, while usefulness is not necessarily high compared with other information variables. Therefore, according
to our empirical analyses it seems unlikely to improve the Taylor rule by incorporating asset prices.Against such a view, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) hold a negative view on
assigning monetary policy to control asset price fluctuations. In support of their view,
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) point out that a central bank aiming at stabilizing asset
prices itself is problematic for various reasons, one of which is that it is difficult to
distinguish whether asset price fluctuations are induced by fundamentals or other 
factors, or both. Upon such reasoning, they presented simulation results that the BOJ
should have been able to achieve better performance if it had pursued a Taylor-type
rule which discards asset price fluctuations (Figure 5). 
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Source: Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
What is especially striking about these results is that despite Bernanke and Gertler
focusing only on the inflation and the output gap, their policy rule implied the need
for rapid tightening such as raising the interest rate from 4 to 8 percent in 1988. In
response to this, BOJ Deputy Governor Yamaguchi argued at a conference sponsored
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, at which the simulation results of
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) were reported, that “I don’t see how a central bank 
can increase interest rates to 8 percent or 10 percent when we don’t have inflation”
(Yamaguchi [1999a]).
There are two important points in Yamaguchi’s (1999a) remarks: one is how to
identify inflationary pressure, and the other is—granted that there is inflationary
pressure—to what extent should a central bank rapidly increase interest rates or
smooth such a rise in interest rates. The latter point can be rephrased as, whether led
by asset prices or the Taylor rule, what would be the likely interest rate hike range a
central bank could rapidly implement without putting too much of a burden on thefinancial system? This issue will be taken up later, when we discuss the relationship
between the financial system and monetary policy management, but here we further
explore the former issue. 
2. Assessment of policy rule simulation 
Why do the estimation results of Bernanke and Gertler shown in Figure 5, despite
focusing only on the inflation and output gap, seem to imply early and rapid 
monetary tightening that contrasts with the estimation results derived from the 
standard Taylor rule as in Figures 3 and 4?
First, let us look at developments in Japan’s CPI and output gap, both of which
form the basis for calculating target values of policy interest rate based on a Taylor-
type policy rule (Figure 6). As a whole, the CPI shows smooth swings, but it rose
rapidly in 1989 and 1997, respectively reflecting the introduction of a 3 percent 
consumption tax and then an increase to 5 percent. With respect to the output gap,
we used the difference between real GDP and its trend obtained by applying the
Hodrick-Prescott filter (hereafter, HP filter).
17 We will later describe problems with
respect to estimating the output gap.
18
Next, when we compare the McCallum-Taylor formula and the Bernanke-Gertler 
formula, the largest difference is that the former uses a backward-looking Taylor rule
based on realized inflation, while the latter uses a forward-looking Taylor rule which
assumes perfect foresight with respect to inflation for one year ahead. In addition, the
Bernanke-Gertler formula puts greater weight on inflation and less on the output gap.
As a result, in a simulation using the Bernanke-Gertler formula, “future” fluctuations
of inflation strongly affect the current target value of the policy interest rate. 
By following the Taylor rule formulas that McCallum (2001) and Bernanke and
Gertler (1999) assume in their estimations, we have used the above-mentioned CPI
and output gap and tried to reproduce the target rate, as shown in Figure 7. The top
panel of Figure 7 shows our estimated results of a backward-looking Taylor rule that
corresponds to what McCallum estimated (Figure 3), and the bottom panel our 
estimated results of a forward-looking Taylor rule that corresponds to the estimate 
by Bernanke-Gertler (Figure 5).
19 You can see that our estimates have reproduced
qualitatively similar results compared with those of McCallum and Bernanke-Gertler.
In our backward-looking Taylor rule, target levels of policy interest rate are as a
whole higher than those of McCallum, which results in a substantially shorter zero
interest rate period and implies rather tighter monetary policy overall, but can avoid
the impractical consequence of embarking on zero interest rates as early as 1987. 
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17. For an explanation of the HP filter, see, for example, Higo and Nakada (1998).
18. There is no explanation in McCallum (2001) of how he measured potential GDP or the output gap. However,
since he assumes the equilibrium real interest rate as constant (3 percent), it is highly likely that he used the 
difference between a log-linear trend and real GDP as the output gap. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) measure the
output gap using monthly data, namely, the difference between the industrial production index (output) and its
quadratic trend.
19. Backward- and forward-looking Taylor rules were derived following formulations of McCallum (2001) and
Bernanke and Gertler (1999). They used weights for the inflation rate and output gap of 1.5 and 0.5, and 
2.00 and 0.33, respectively. While McCallum (2001) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999) make their estimation
assuming the equilibrium real interest rate as constant, we estimate the output gap by using an HP filter, and
thus, taking into account effects of a declining potential growth rate since entering the 1990s, we regard the
growth rate of the HP-filtered trend for the past year as the real interest rate to derive the Taylor rule.On the other hand, our forward-looking Taylor rule, despite quarterly and monthly
differences, follows well the estimation results of Bernanke-Gertler as a whole.
One point that can be derived from these results is the delay in the pace of reduc-
ing interest rates since 1993 and, according to the policy rule, the pace of monetary
easing indeed slowed when the BOJ was about to face a then record-low official 
discount rate of 2.5 percent that was reached during the period of expansion of the
bubble. At this stage, we leave it until the next section to examine in more detail the
period of monetary easing, and focus on the period of expansion of the bubble.
During this period, there were two humps in the estimate of McCallum, from 1989
to 1990, and in that of Bernanke-Gertler, from 1988 to 1989. When we look at 
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Figure 6  Data for Estimating the Taylor Rule



























Notes: 1. Figures for the CPI are adjusted for the impact of consumption tax. 
2. Output gaps are computed as a difference between actual and HP-filtered
series for the real GDP. HP-filtered series computed for the sample period
from 1955/II to 2000/IV with the smoothing parameter λ = 1,600.
Sources: Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and
Telecommunications, Consumer Price Index; Cabinet Office, 
National Accounts.the basic data, the first hump seems to have resulted from the introduction of 
the consumption tax (3 percent) in April 1989. If we adjust for this factor and 
conduct a similar estimation, the first hump disappears for both backward- and 
forward-looking Taylor rules.
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Figure 7  Examination of the Taylor Rule










[1] Backward-Looking Taylor Rule
Target (consumption tax adjusted)
Target (consumption tax non-adjusted)
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[2] Forward-Looking Taylor Rule
Target (consumption tax adjusted)
Target (consumption tax non-adjusted)
Actual
Note: Taylor rule is defined as follows:
Basic equation: Rt = r* t + π * + α . (π t+T – π *) + β . (Yt – Y*) 
r* t : Equilibrium real short-term interest rate at period t
π *: Targeted rate of inflation
Rt: Uncollateralized overnight call rate at period t
π t: Rate of CPI inflation at period t
Yt – Y*: Output gap at period t
The rates of inflation in the second term of the right-hand side are those for the
current period (T = 0) and one-year ahead (T = 4), respectively.
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly; Ministry of Public
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Consumer Price
Index; Cabinet Office, National Accounts.If we consider that one-time price increases induced by an introduction of the
consumption tax should not be offset by monetary tightening, then realized develop-
ment of the call rate from the late 1980s to the early 1990s more or less followed
what had been derived as the target rate from the backward-looking Taylor rule. 
This result implies that while one cannot say the BOJ delayed tightening when
viewed from developments in the inflation rate at the time, one can say it did if 
perfect foresight of core inflation rates for one year ahead is practically feasible. Even
in the latter case, it might be difficult, as Deputy Governor Yamaguchi said, to insist
on the pursuit of rapid monetary tightening such as raising the interest rate from 4 to
8 percent in 1988, as Bernanke and Gertler pointed out.
Then, to what extent is core inflation, which excludes special effects such as a hike
in the consumption tax, predictable? A major factor that affects predictability is no
doubt the accuracy of measuring the output gap.
C. Measuring the Output Gap and Asset Price Bubbles
The discussion above reveals that in accurately assessing monetary policy manage-
ment, it is crucial to gauge inflationary pressure by carefully examining its basic data
of prices and real GDP. In so doing, a serious problem with respect to the output gap
is that, since the level of the output gap will vary depending on the estimates of
potential GDP, the derived optimal value of the interest rate might differ, even from
the same observed inflation rate, GDP level, and same target rate. In other words,
prevailing expectations during the period of emergence of the bubble that Japan was
entering a new era of economic development corresponded to optimistic expectations
for potential growth. Thus, the path of optimal interest rates will differ depending on
whether one adopts the optimistic expectations at the time or accepts the potential
growth rate adjusted with the benefit of hindsight that such expectations were 
nothing more than euphoria. 
What typically shows this point is, as illustrated in the upper panel of Figure 8, the
evaluation of the real GDP growth path on a real-time basis. The period 1987/I is the
bottom of the yen appreciation recession prior to the bubble period. At this point,
when we plot a linear trend line from 1977/IV to 1987/I, it almost corresponds to the
growth trend, which is almost 3.5 percent annually. However, from 1987/I to 
mid-1991, real GDP expanded following the trend line of 5 percent growth. If an
increase in asset prices reflects euphoria, the perceived potential output path will 
shift upward as economic expansion is prolonged, resulting in the underestimation 
of inflationary pressure in view of the output gap. On the contrary, in the case of a
rational bubble in which market participants correctly recognize fundamental values 
of asset prices as well as the sustainability of currently overvalued asset prices, an 
output gap is assessed based on a recognition that the potential output path remains
unchanged, which leads to the same judgment as one reaches with the benefit of 
hindsight that the asset price increase was based completely on euphoric expectations. 
A similar argument seems to be applicable to the recent U.S. experience (the
lower panel of Figure 8). Meyer (2000) states that a major challenge for U.S. 
monetary policy as of March 2000 was to determine how “to allow the economy 
to realize the full benefits of the new possibilities while avoiding an overheated 
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Asset Price Bubbles, Price Stability, and Monetary Policy: Japan’s Experienceeconomy.” He also emphasizes the importance of assessing the level of potential GDP
in evaluating inflationary pressure, against the background of enormous changes in
economic structure (namely the “new economy”), behind rising U.S. stock prices.
This argument is quite convincing, but in applying Meyer’s argument to Japan’s 
bubble period, we had to judge what portion of increase in the growth rate should
have been tolerated as an upward trend shift of real GDP in order to enjoy the 
benefits of the productivity improvement. With the benefit of hindsight, most of 
the trend shift was temporary, and should not have been accommodated.
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Commerce, National Income and Products Accounts.It should be noted that continued economic expansion gradually makes it difficult
to decompose a rising growth rate into cyclical and trend components. The difficulty
in such decomposition according to Japan’s data has been clearly shown in recent 
literature on measurement errors in the output gap using real-time data. For example,
Kamada and Masuda (2001) examine the magnitude of measurement errors in 
the output gap in terms of estimation procedures and historical revision of data. 
The production-function approach to estimate the output gap generally assumes a
100 percent capacity utilization rate in the non-manufacturing sector and defines the
fitted trend to the Solow residual as total factor productivity (TFP). They show that
this approach, however, is vulnerable to the effects of data accumulation, altering
trend estimates. Miyao (2001) also points out, based on the same methodology 
to compute the output gap, that the output gap estimates crucially depend on how to
specify the trend to fit the Solow residual, i.e., how to extract changes in the TFP
from the behavior of the Solow residual. 
Regarding the measurement of the output gap and fundamentals of stock prices,
Bernanke and Gertler (2001) state that “[a]dmittedly, the output gap is difficult to
measure, but we are more confident in economists’ ability to measure the output gap
than to measure the fundamental component of stock prices,” and “[i]n addition, the
behavior of inflation provides a real-time indicator of the magnitude of the output
gap, whereas there is no analogous indicator to provide confirmation of estimates of
stock fundamentals.” However, Japan’s experience shows that central banks are
unlikely to evaluate potential inflationary pressure stemming from asset price fluctua-
tions “without getting into the business of deciding what is a fundamental and 
what is not” (Bernanke and Gertler [1999]), and their argument thus seems to be too
optimistic. Unfortunately, Japan’s experience suggests the following: first, even
though we carefully watched inflation data, the inflation rate itself did not necessarily
provide a predominant real-time indicator of the magnitude of the output gap.
Second, therefore, one could not have estimated at the time a correct potential
growth path unless one could have identified whether then-prevailing expectations
that the world was entering a new era of economic development that induced asset
price rises corresponded to euphoria or not.
20
At the same time, the above argument denies the effectiveness of asset prices 
during the period of emergence of the bubble as a leading indicator of inflation or as
a policy objective variable. Rather, Japan’s experience implies that when the nation 
is in a state of euphoria or experiencing a new economy, evaluation of inflationary
pressure and also the fundamental values of asset prices are to a considerable extent
two sides of the same coin. In such a case, in order to judge the validity of monetary
tightening during periods of asset price rises, other criteria such as minimization 
of maximum loss under uncertainty will become necessary, which also requires a
judgment that takes account of effects on the financial system when an asset price rise
was induced by a bubble or euphoria.
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20. Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) point out that the stock price yield spread widened to about 6 percent
in 1990, which implies that the market expected the economy to grow at about 8 percent on a nominal basis 
if the risk premium is assumed at 2 percent. This estimate typically shows that it is inevitable that excessively
optimistic growth expectations and asset price bubbles can never be assessed separably.However, it is possible to think that, even though a central bank cannot judge
whether it is a bubble or the debut of a new economy during the period of 
emergence of a bubble, thus giving up tightening, it can aggressively pursue 
monetary easing in the process of the bursting of the bubble. If this line of thinking
is correct, it might be possible to say that the information content of asset prices, 
i.e., effectiveness as an information variable, differs during the emergence of a bubble
and its bursting, and asset prices have higher information content when a bubble 
collapses. This point should be empirically tested, and we will briefly examine it
based on Japanese data in the next section.
D. Preemptive Monetary Policy Mindful of Financial System Stability
Another remaining point of discussion with respect to the period of emergence of
bubble is that, given that the bursting of a bubble induces financial system instability,
how much of a rise in interest rates would have been desirable and possible in the
process of emergence of the bubble to ensure financial system stability?
1. Is an interest rate rise supported?
One popular view is that, to contain excessive asset price hikes and minimize 
maximum losses, it would be necessary to increase interest rates at an early stage 
even when it is difficult to judge whether there is a bubble or the arrival of a new
economy. In this case, however, most of the possible fruit of the new economy, which
Meyer (2000) expects, would be lost, but financial system instability that throws 
an economy into catastrophe might be contained. This standpoint advocates that 
the most effective responses would be to contain the accumulation of excessive risks
ex ante and ensure continuing stability of the financial system. Such early monetary
tightening might not receive the understanding of the public. In the Iwato boom of
the 1950s, the necessity of early monetary tightening was discussed in the context of
stable growth versus high growth, but stable growth gained less support at the time.
21
There was deep-rooted suspicion about the necessity of monetary tightening during
the bubble period. Therefore, it seems to be no easy task to achieve a consensus that 
a substantial and real-time interest rate increase is desirable at a stage when it is 
difficult to judge whether there is a bubble or the arrival of a new economy.
2. How does a large increase in interest rates affect the financial system?
Expectations became extremely bullish during the period of emergence and 
expansion of the bubble, and thus a substantial increase in interest rates would have
been necessary to correct such expectations.
22
Therefore, in examining whether a prompt interest rate increase can prevent asset
price bubbles from ballooning, it becomes important to examine effects of rapid
monetary tightening on the financial system. In fact, although they did not take
account of the effects of a rapid interest rate hike on the financial system in their 
simulation model, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) also emphasize that it is important
to ensure financial system stability in considering the relationship between asset
prices and monetary policy.
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21. See the Committee for Compiling One-Hundred-Year History of the Bank of Japan (1986).
22. See Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001).Then, how we should consider the potential adverse effects on financial institutions
and the financial system of a substantial rise in interest rates? When we look at the size
of bond portfolios held by the banking sector at the time from flow of funds statistics
(Figure 9, upper panel), in the late 1980s the share of government bonds to total assets
had been a little less than 8 percent, slightly higher than the present 6 percent. If we
include bonds other than government bonds such as corporate bonds, the figure was
14–16 percent compared with the present 12–13 percent. While the average duration
of such bond portfolios is unknown, bearing in mind that the issuance of government
bonds in the late 1980s had predominantly been long-term ones as shown in the 
bottom panel of Figure 9, it is highly likely that the duration was longer than the recent
average of about five to six years.
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Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.Based on the above consideration, if we boldly assume the total assets of the bank-
ing sector in the late 1980s to be ¥600 trillion, of which ¥100 trillion represented
bond holdings (a ratio to total assets of 16.6 percent), and estimate interest rate risk 
by changing the duration from three to seven years and the interest rate from 50 to
400 basis points, the results would be as shown in Table 1. Under a duration of five
years and an upward shift in the yield curve of 200 basis points, an assumption that is
relatively moderate, the estimated result indicates a capital loss of ¥10 trillion in the
portfolio, which is about half of the then ¥20 trillion net capital of the banking sector.
The estimation here is quite rough and thus there are reservations, but at the 
same time, bearing in mind that Japan’s financial institutions also hold a massive
amount of stocks whose price volatility risk is larger than that attaching to bonds,
23
it is difficult to deny that effects of rapid monetary tightening on the financial 
system might have been extremely large. Therefore, from the viewpoint of avoiding
financial system instability, it seems that the BOJ had no choice but to adopt gradual
tightening by taking account of interest rate smoothing.
24
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Table 1  Interest Rate Risks for Securities Portfolio
¥ trillions
Changes in  Average duration (years)
interest rates 
(basis points) 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0
50 –1.5 –1.8 –2.0 –2.3 –2.5 –2.8 –3.0 –3.3 –3.5
100 –3.0 –3.5 –4.0 –4.5 –5.0 –5.5 –6.0 –6.5 –7.0
150 –4.5 –5.3 –6.0 –6.8 –7.5 –8.3 –9.0 –9.8 –10.5
200 –6.0 –7.0 –8.0 –9.0 –10.0 –11.0 –12.0 –13.0 –14.0
250 –7.5 –8.8 –10.0 –11.3 –12.5 –13.8 –15.0 –16.3 –17.5
300 –9.0 –10.5 –12.0 –13.5 –15.0 –16.5 –18.0 –19.5 –21.0
350 –10.5 –12.3 –14.0 –15.8 –17.5 –19.3 –21.0 –22.8 –24.5
400 –12.0 –14.0 –16.0 –18.0 –20.0 –22.0 –24.0 –26.0 –28.0
23. While a 4 percent interest rate rise has a direct shock on bank balance sheets, such shock can be amplified by 
turbulence on the real side of the economy due to a possible stock price plunge and rapid appreciation of the yen.
However, equity portfolios of financial institutions at the time held enormous unrealized gains since they were 
evaluated by the lower-of-cost-or-market method, and were considered to be a sufficient buffer against a stock price
plunge. Therefore, if compared with the present situation where prolonged sluggish stock prices and the write-off
of nonperforming loans has drained such unrealized gains and financial institutions have to adopt market price 
valuation, the effects of stock price fluctuation risk on bank management and the financial system might have been
small at the time. In fact, according to flow of funds statistics, stocks held by the banking sector at the time were
about 3–4 percent of total assets, which is almost equivalent to banks’ net capital. However, it should be noted that
flow of funds statistics evaluated stocks held by the banking sector by book value before 1994.
24. As a reason for interest rate smoothing, Goodfriend (1991) points out the possibility that financial institutions’
portfolios would incur huge capital losses when the interest rate has been unexpectedly and substantially raised.
Of course, it might be the case that such a central bank’s behavior to formulate its action by considering the 
capital loss of private financial institutions could induce moral hazard vis-à-vis their portfolio investment 
behavior. However, it is established as a practice of central banks worldwide, including that in Japan, to avoid
unexpected large changes in interest rates. Thus, it is undeniable that ignoring such practices might trigger 
financial system turbulence.IV. Asset Prices, Financial System Problems, and Monetary
Policy during the Bursting of the Bubble
In this section, we summarize Japan’s experience during the period when the bubble
burst, especially focusing on destabilizing effects on the financial system, and discuss
their implications on monetary policy. 
A. The Bubble and Japan’s Financial System
Looking back at Japan’s experience of the period when the bubble burst, it can be
characterized by the fact that financial system instability was intensified, thereby
seemingly amplifying the adverse impacts of the bursting of the bubble. 
Bearing this in mind, let us look back at the emergence and bursting of the 
bubble from the aspect of the financial system. Against the background of financial
liberalization, fund-raising by major firms had been rapidly liberalized since around
1980 as evidenced by a shift from bank-based to capital market-based financing, but
banks were only allowed to enter the securities business gradually, and thus they were
very concerned that major firms would become less dependent on them for funding.
In the meantime, since interest rates on deposits had gradually been liberalized, banks
forwent the rent stemming from accepting deposits with regulated interest rates and
were inclined to aggressively extend loans to small and medium-sized enterprises
against real estate collateral as well as real estate-related loans at low interest rates
(Figure 10).
In retrospect, such aggressive lending at low interest rates seems to have been 
pursued by financial institutions taking excessive risks compared with their profit
outlook (Figure 11). In particular, since financial institutions lacked recognition of
risk concentration and interactions, they tended to concentrate lending on specific
industries such as construction companies, the real estate sector, and non-banks.
However, loan concentration on such specific industries could be seen as a natural
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Note: Real estate-related industries correspond to real estate, construction, and 
non-banks.
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.shift to promising industries and not as a risk if a rise in real estate prices had not
been misunderstood as resulting from a change in economic fundamentals. It was
only when the bursting of the bubble materialized that such concentration was 
eventually recognized as a risk.
One factor that derailed risk judgment at the time was a surge in collateral value
due to rising real estate prices. Originally, there is information asymmetry between
firms and financial institutions, namely, financial institutions are not able to accu-
rately grasp the reality of a firm’s financial conditions, and hence changes in the net
worth of firms due to the emergence and bursting of asset price bubbles led to ups
and downs in collateral value, which in turn resulted in amplifying credit expansion
and contraction. Such a mechanism, which might be characterized as a financial
accelerator, induced the financial system as a whole to amplify the swings in the 
business conditions, an effect that was especially serious when the bubble burst.
However, the materialization of effects was not even between the real side of the
economy and the financial system. There was a temporary economic recovery until
around 1997, despite the economy’s shouldering of the adverse effects in the financial
system due to asset price declines. Economic recovery from late 1995 was relatively
robust, and the growth of business investment in particular turned positive in fiscal
1995 after an interval of three years, led mainly by investment in electronic and
telecommunications-related areas. Stock prices also rallied rapidly from mid-July and
recovered the 20,000 level in the Nikkei 225 Stock Average at year-end. In fiscal 1996, in
addition to public investment by the government, favorable private-sector performance
strongly propelled the economy, resulting in a high growth rate of 5 percent. 
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Notes: 1. Figures are for domestically licensed banks (summation of city 
banks, regional banks, regional banks II, trust banks, and long-term
credit banks).
2. The definitions of ROA and ROE are as follows:
ROA = (Profit for the term)/(total assets – acceptances and 
guarantees).
ROE = (Profit for the term)/(total stockholders’ equity).
Source: Japanese Bankers Association, Financial Statements of All Banks.Reflecting such developments in the real economy, the target interest rate
according to the backward-looking Taylor rule (Figure 7), which had once reached
the zero bound by early 1995, rose at a fairly rapid pace up to 1997. On the other
hand, the BOJ’s actual policy rate had rapidly declined since 1995 and crossed the
target rate based on the Taylor rule. The background to such divergence seems to be
the concerns over the serious balance-sheet adjustment in nonfinancial and financial
sectors, constraining the economic recovery. In fact, even though the economy 
had been recovering at a rather rapid pace, the nonperforming loans of financial
institutions had been increasing (Figure 12), thus indicating that balance-sheet
adjustment had not necessarily progressed during the period of this recovery. 
Why were there conflicting moves between real economic activity and the 
financial system? One possible answer is that Japan’s financial system had historically
heavily relied on bank-based financing (Table 2). Under a bank-based financial 
system, banks accumulate internal reserves when the economy is sound and absorb
losses stemming from firms’ poor business performance or bankruptcy during a 
recession, and hence financial intermediation plays a buffer role against short-term
shocks.
25 However, such a risk-smoothing function attaching to the financial system,
observed in normal times, will be suddenly lost if the system encounters a shock that
erodes banks’ net capital to the extent it threatens their soundness. Therefore, the
effects of the bursting of the bubble on the financial system seem to be an invisible
headwind up to a certain “critical point,” after which they suddenly materialize.
In fact, in autumn 1997 when the economy experienced a slowdown parallel with
the government’s moves toward fiscal consolidation that included a consumption tax
hike and coincided with East Asian economic crises, financial instability materialized
triggered by the collapse of major financial institutions such as Sanyo Securities,
Hokkaido-Takushoku Bank, and Yamaichi Securities. Such financial system insta-
bility, together with other factors, seems to have exerted extremely strong deflationary
pressure on the economy. As a consequence, Japan experienced a serious recession
where real GDP (68SNA basis) declined for five consecutive quarters from the fourth
quarter of 1997.
26
As such, the characteristic of a bank-based financial system, wherein financial
effects stemming from the bursting of the bubble materialized rapidly beyond a 
certain critical point, together with a lack of disclosure and underdeveloped safety net
measures, made it all the more difficult to deal promptly with the nonperforming-
loan problem. To resolve financial system problems, it was desirable to inject 
public funds and promptly deal with the nonperforming-loan problem, including 
the disposal of failed financial institutions. However, until the effects of financial
instability materialized, the financial supervisory authorities had been concerned over
the possibility of a financial crisis, triggered by the disclosure of the actual financial
conditions of the banking sector. Given such a lack of disclosure, the public was 
apathetic about the injection of public funds, and consequently the resolution of 
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25. Baba and Hisada (2002) discuss the characteristics of Japan’s financial system in detail. 
26. However, using the current 93SNA basis, during the five quarters between 1997/IV to 1998/IV there were only
two, 1998/I and III, when real GDP recorded negative growth. the financial system problem was postponed. It was from 1997 to 1998, when the
financial system was driven to the brink of malfunctioning, that public recognition
changed, but by then the magnitude of the problem had become so extensive that
drastic steps were increasingly difficult to take. 
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Notes: 1. Figures are summations of city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks 
(figures for all banks and all deposit-taking institutions are impossible to
retroact before fiscal 1995).
2. Risk management loans are summations of loans to borrowers in legal bank-
ruptcy, past-due loans in arrears by six months or more, and loans in arrears
by three months or more and less than six months.
Sources: Financial Services Agency (http://www.fsa.go.jp); Cabinet Office, National
Accounts.B. Financial System Instability Due to the Bursting of Asset Price Bubbles and
Monetary Policy
Next, let us examine to what extent monetary easing effects were offset during the
period when the bubble burst because of financial system problems.
It is difficult, however, to give a direct answer to this question. Nevertheless, 
looking at the quantitative growth of financial indicators from the viewpoint of
financial system problems and monetary easing effects, the current monetary easing
phase is different and unusual compared with past easing phases, because while 
assets of the BOJ and monetary base (which are the liabilities of the BOJ) have been
showing marked growth, money supply (M2+CDs) has been growing at a low 
rate and bank loans have been declining (Figure 13). On the fund allocation front,
while loans to manufacturing industries, which are believed to carry relatively high
profitability, declined throughout the 1990s, loans to the real estate industry followed
an increasing trend until 1998 (Figure 14).
The high growth of the monetary base and the contrasting, continuous decline in
private lending and rigidity in lending to low-profit industries strongly imply that
problems which hamper the effectiveness of monetary policy lie in the malfunction-
ing of the financial system stemming from balance-sheet problems of firms and
financial institutions. The evidence described above suggests the possibility of 
two mechanisms: (1) an increase in nonperforming loans erodes the net capital of
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Table 2  Financial Structure of Three Major Countries
[1] Financial Liabilities Held by Nonfinancial Corporations (Ratio to Total Financial Liabilities) 
Percent
Japan United States Germany
Borrowing 38.8 12.1 33.3
Bonds 9.3 8.2 1.3
Shares and equities 33.8 66.6 54.3
Others 18.1 13.0 11.0
[2] Financial Assets Held by Households (Ratio to Total Financial Assets)
Percent
Japan United States Germany
Currency and deposits 54.0 9.6 35.2
Bonds 5.3 9.5 10.1
Investment trusts 2.3 10.9 10.5
Shares and equities 8.1 37.3 16.8
Insurance and pension 26.4 30.5 26.4
Others 3.9 2.2 1.1
Notes: 1. Figures are those for the end of 1999.
2. Regarding financial debt for enterprises, stocks are evaluated at the market value, and thus
do not necessarily correspond to the accumulated funding by enterprises. In addition, U.S.
figures include solely those for proprietorships, and regard their net worth as proprietors’
equities in the household sector. Thus, it should be noted that the ratio of equities to total
assets is likely to be higher, compared to those for other countries. For details, see Bank of
Japan, Research and Statistics Department (2001). 
Source: Bank of Japan, Research and Statistics Department (2001).financial institutions, resulting in a decline in risk-taking ability (a credit crunch);
and (2) even though firms become unprofitable, financial institutions continue 
lending to them to prevent losses from materializing (forbearance lending). Under
such circumstances, loans to unprofitable firms become fixed and funds are not 
channeled to growing firms, holding down economic activity.
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Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.As such, when the financial system carries problems stemming from the 
bursting of a bubble, the effectiveness of the central bank’s monetary easing will 
be substantially counteracted. To restore effectiveness, it seems desirable to restore
financial system soundness.
Once a financial system tumbles into a critical situation, the boundary between
monetary and prudential policies becomes extremely ambiguous. Japan’s experience
contains interesting lessons on this point, but since such discussion departs from the
main topic of this paper, issues related to asset price bubbles, we will introduce them
in Appendix 2. 
C. Early Response to Financial Crises
We have stated that, when taking account of effects on the financial system, the BOJ
had no choice but to pursue a gradual monetary policy during the period of 
emergence of the bubble. Then, could the BOJ have effected substantial monetary
easing at an earlier stage when the bubble burst?
Mori, Shiratsuka, and Taguchi (2001) examine the above question based on 
four criteria, i.e., monetary aggregates, equity yield spread, the Taylor rule, and real
short-term interest rates, and point out that “the reaction of monetary policy was
rather swift to the extent it was taken against the background of a normal business
contraction with stock adjustments.” In fact, McCallum’s assessment based on the
policy rule shows that the tempo and magnitude of the reduction in interest rates up
to around 1993 was just about appropriate, compared with inflation and the output
gap at the time.
In contrast, the pace of the BOJ’s reduction of interest rates from late 1993 to
autumn 1995 was, according to the Taylor-type policy rule, slowed when the BOJ
was about to face a record-low official discount rate of 2.5 percent during the period
of expansion of the bubble, suggesting the possibility that the BOJ was rather 
reluctant to pursue additional easing. There are conflicting views with respect to 
the delay in the pace of interest rate reduction since 1993: one argument holds that
interest rates should have been reduced at a quicker pace, while another advocates
that even if interest rates had been reduced more quickly the effects would have been
limited since the financial system was already substantially damaged. In light of the
subsequent development of Japan’s economy and with the benefit of hindsight, a
view that prompt interest rate reduction more faithful to the Taylor rule was desirable
seems to be convincing.
However, based on an observation that the financial system was already sub-
stantially damaged in the period after 1993 and the effectiveness of monetary easing
was limited, what might be worth trying was a more drastic than normal interest rate
reduction before 1993, even though it was adequate in light of the Taylor rule. In the
previous section, in line with Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001), we pointed
out that expectations become extremely bullish during a period of euphoria and thus
a substantial increase in interest rates would have been necessary to induce a change
in such expectations. Put differently, even if interest rates had been high, the effect of
monetary tightening would not have materialized to any great degree until such
expectations had been adjusted downward. If such expectations had been adjusted
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due to the combined effect of the rise in interest rates itself and the revision of
euphoric expectations. This presumption might lead us to the conclusion that an
early interest rate reduction was indeed necessary. 
In fact, while the BOJ rapidly raised interest rates in 1989, the Nikkei 225 Stock
Average steadily rose and peaked at end-December, but then rapidly fell in 1990.
Taking such developments into account, one could argue that the central bank
needed to swiftly reduce interest rates when effects of previous interest rate rises were
confirmed. In addition, if it had been judged that the collapse of euphoric expecta-
tions would lead to a persistent fall in real estate prices and could trigger financial
system instability, further drastic monetary easing might have been exercised.
However, here again an important point is the predictability of the effects of a 
bubble bursting, and therefore it seems that the BOJ, similar to the case during the
emergence and expansion of the bubble, should have made a judgment as to what
extent the potential output path would continue to shift downward as a result of the
effects of the bursting of the bubble on the financial system (i.e., to what extent a
decline in asset prices would be permanent). 
When making such a difficult judgment, do the asset price developments 
mentioned above provide additional information? As previously mentioned, one
hypothesis is that the forecasting power of asset prices might not be strong during the
period when asset price bubbles are being generated, since it is difficult to identify
whether there is excessive optimism or indeed the arrival of a new era due to 
structural changes, but a rapid or continuous decline in asset prices when a bubble 
is bursting might to some extent include direct information with respect to the
degree of pessimism on the outlook for the economy and indirect information with
respect to problems that the financial system might have to face in the future. If this
hypothesis holds, it might imply that asset prices are more useful during the period
when a bubble is bursting as an information variable for monetary policy.
D. Asset Prices as an Information Variable during a Bursting Bubble Period
In this subsection, we empirically verify the usefulness of asset prices as an infor-
mation variable; in particular, we comprehensively test their forecasting power for 
the rates of inflation and real economic growth by examining the periods when the
bubble emerged and also when it burst.
27
By following Stock and Watson (2001), we estimate models for forecasting 
price inflation (measured by the CPI) and output growth (real GDP) forecasting
models with quarterly data. The forecasting models employ the variable of interest
for h-quarter ahead y
h
t+h as a dependent variable, and lagged dependent variable yt and
a candidate indicator xt as independent variables. That is,
y
h
t+h = α + β (L)yt + γ (L)xt + ε
h
t+h, (2)
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27. Effectiveness of asset prices as information variables for monetary policy will be comprehensively discussed in a
forthcoming paper from the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies. where α is a constant term, β (L) and γ (L) are lag polynomials for the dependent 
variable and indicator variable, respectively, and ε
h
t+h is an error term. 
We employ two, four, and eight quarters ahead as a forecasting horizon h, and 40
variables as a candidate indicator, such as the level of economic activities (index of
industrial production, unemployment rate, and business condition DI, etc.), price,
wage, and commodity prices (wholesale price index, wage index, and oil prices, etc.),
money (M2+CDs, bank lending, etc.), asset prices (long- and short-term interest
rates, foreign exchange rates, stock prices, and land prices, etc.). We use both 
nominal and real variables, if available, and apply various transformations, including
original, log-transformed, first-differenced, and HP-filtered values. In sum, the total
numbers of information variables are 148 and 147 series for inflation and output
growth forecasts, respectively (Table 3).
Figure 15 summarizes the performances of the aforementioned forecasting models
in two periods: one is the period for the expansion of the bubble (1987–90), and the
other is the period for the bursting of the bubble (1991–94). The plotted figures in
the figure are relative mean squared forecast error (relative MSFE) of the forecasting
model for each information variable, standardized by the absolute MSFE of bench-
mark autoregressive (AR) model. Therefore, a relative MSFE of less than one implies
that out-of-sample forecastability is improved by adding the information variable in
the forecasting model. The figure shows that forecastability is not necessarily
improved by adding a candidate variable, and information content of these variables
varies, depending on the external environments.
28
Let us focus on the forecasting performances of asset price indicators. With
respect to the inflation forecasts, foreign exchange rate indicators contribute to
improving the forecastability for the period of the bursting of the bubble. Long-term
interest rate indicators also show relatively good performance in a four-quarter-ahead
forecast for the period of the bursting of the bubble. In the meantime, regarding 
the output growth forecasts, stock price indicators have high forecastability four 
and eight quarters ahead, and their forecastability is improved in the period of the
bursting of the bubble. Foreign exchange rate indicators generally contribute to
improving forecasting performances, and land price indicators are also effective in the
period of the bursting of the bubble. Comparing the inflation and output growth
forecasts, asset price indicators generally show better performances in the latter case.
This might be a case in which asset prices contain relevant information on output
fluctuation via the wealth effect and the credit channel. 
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28. In doing the out-of-sample forecast exercises, the parameters for forecasting models are updated by conducting
rolling regression with the previous 40-quarter data. This is because the forecasting performance is improved,
compared with those obtained by fixing the beginning of the sample and extending quarter by quarter. This 
is consistent with the fact that information content of the information variables is highly dependent on the 
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Table 3  Data for Forecasting Exercises
Nominal/real Ave./end Transformation
Variables Code SA N R Ave. End Level Log Dif Gap
— r av ed lev ln ln1d gap
Real GDP rgdp SA —   ———  
Industrial production ip SA —   ———  
Territorial industry  sanji SA —   ———  
Capacity utilization capu SA —   ———  
Business condition DI tnkzen SA —   —   —— 
Business condition DI  tnksei SA —   —   —— 
(manufacturing) 
Business condition DI  tnkhi SA —   —   —— 
(non-manufacturing)
Unemployment rate unemp SA —   —   —— 
Ratio of job offers  kyujin SA —   —   —— 
to applicants
Machinery orders  kijmi SA —   ———  
(private demand)
Machinery orders  kijse SA —   ———  
(manufacturing)
Machinery orders  kijhi SA —   ———  
(non-manufacturing)
Orders received for  kenjal SA —   ———  
construction (total)
Orders received for 
construction kenjmi SA —   ———  
(private demand)
Orders received for 
construction kenjhi SA —   ———  
(non-manufacturing)
Value of public works  ukeall SA —   ———  
contracted (total)
Value of public works 
contracted ukekun SA —   ———  
(central government)
Value of public works 
contracted ukechi SA —   ———  
(local government)
New dwellings  juckko SA —   ———  
started (units)
New dwellings started  juckme SA —   ———  
(floor area)
Building construction  ckhime SA —   ———  
started (floor area)
Registration of new  car SA —   ———  
passenger cars
Sales of large-scale  kouri SA —   ———  
retail stores
Sales of department stores hyaka SA —   ———  
Customs clearance exports  expt SA —   ———  
(U.S. dollars, yen)
Customs clearance imports  impt SA —   ———  
(U.S. dollars, yen)65
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Table 3 (continued)
Nominal/real Ave./end Transformation
Variables Code SA N R Ave. End Level Log Dif Gap
— r av ed lev ln ln1d gap
Nominal GDP ngdp SA   —   ———  —
GDP deflator pgdp SA   —   ———  —
CPI cpi SA   —   ———  —
Domestic WPI wpi NSA   —   ———  —
DWPI intermediate  wpiin NSA   —   ——  — materials
Import price index ipiav NSA   —   ———  —
IPI raw materials ipiso NSA   —   ——  —
Wage index earn SA    ———  —
Oil prices  oil NSA   —   ——  — (U.S. dollars, yen)
Domestic commodities  commed NSA   —   ——  —
Reuters index  reu NSA   —   ——  — (U.S. dollars, yen)
CRB index  crb NSA   —   ——  — (U.S. dollars, yen)
Gold (U.S. dollars, yen) gld NSA   —   ——  —
Monetary base mon0 SA    ———  —
M1 mon1 SA    ———  —
M2+CDs mon2 SA    ———  —
Fund-raising by domestic  mon4 SA   —   ——  — nonfinancial sector
Bank lending lended SA   —   ——  —
Money multiplier mlp SA   —   —   —— 
M2+CDs velocity velo SA   —   ———  
Banknotes note SA    ———  
JGB 10-year jgb NSA      ———
Long-short spreads sprd NSA   ——  ———
Loan contract rates alnd NSA    —   ———
Yen/dollar FX rate rate NSA     ——  
Effective FX rate efrat NSA     ——  
Nikkei 225 stock prices nik NSA     ——  —
TOPIX stock prices tpx NSA     ——  —
TSE trading volume tosho NSA —   ——  —
Land price index land NSA   —   ——  —66 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002
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Notes: 1.  Plotted figures are relative mean squared forecast errors (relative MSFE), 
standardized by the absolute MSFE of the benchmark autoregressive model.
2.  Horizontal and vertical axes are figures for 1987–90 and 1991–94, respectively.In addition, we compute the combination indicators for each category: the level
of economic activities; prices, wages, and commodity prices; money; and asset prices
(Tables 4 and 5). We employ median, trimmed mean as combination indicators by
considering the potential effects of outliers in forecasts.
29 Although the combined
asset price forecast of inflation does not provide improvements over the AR bench-
mark, that of output growth contributes to improving forecast accuracy. However,
other combined forecasts, including the level of economic activities and money, also
perform well. 
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29. In computing the combined indicators, we exclude information variables with poor forecasting performance 
(relative MSFE is greater than two), and choose one from among those with high correlation. As a result, we
employ 44 series out of 148 and 40 out of 147 in inflation and output growth forecasts, respectively. 
Table 4  Inflation Forecastability of Combined Indicators
Two quarters ahead Four quarters ahead Eight quarters ahead
1987–90 1991–94 1987–90 1991–94 1987–90 1991–94
Benchmark model (absolute RMSFE)
AR model 1.60 0.81 1.27 0.85 0.88 1.10
Univariate forecast (relative MSFE)
RW model (1) 1.44 1.19 2.00 1.10 3.97 0.79
RW model (4) 2.46 3.82 1.00 0.88 2.39 0.85
Bivariate forecast (relative MSFE)
Economic activities
Median 1.01 0.94 0.96 0.78 0.78 0.75
Trimmed mean (1) 1.02 0.95 0.93 0.79 0.69 0.71
Trimmed mean (2) 1.02 0.95 0.94 0.80 0.74 0.72
Prices, wages, and commodity prices
Median 0.95 0.93 0.84 0.81 0.60 0.87
Trimmed mean (1) 0.98 0.84 0.85 0.73 0.53 0.82
Trimmed mean (2) 0.96 0.86 0.87 0.77 0.58 0.85
Money
Median 1.01 1.02 1.05 0.89 1.09 0.70
Trimmed mean (1) 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.87 1.13 0.54
Trimmed mean (2) 1.02 0.97 1.03 0.89 1.18 0.64
Asset prices
Median 1.16 1.07 1.04 1.05 0.98 0.93
Trimmed mean (1) 1.08 1.10 1.02 1.03 1.04 0.92
Trimmed mean (2) 1.09 1.11 1.02 1.04 1.02 0.92
All variables
Median 1.02 0.95 0.97 0.82 0.92 0.85
Trimmed mean (1) 1.00 0.94 0.90 0.82 0.72 0.74
Trimmed mean (2) 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.83 0.73 0.76
Trimmed mean (6) 1.01 0.95 0.93 0.83 0.78 0.80
Notes: 1. RW models (1) and (4) conduct inflation forecasting by assuming that log differences of price
levels from one and four quarters ago follow a random walk pattern. 
2. Trimmed means (1), (2), and (6) compute the average after excluding the largest/smallest,
largest/smallest two, and largest/smallest three forecasts, respectively. To sum up the empirical exercise of the information content of asset prices, the
usefulness of asset prices as an information variable seems higher in the period of 
the bursting of the bubble than that of the expansion of the bubble. However, their
usefulness is unlikely to be significantly high, compared with other information 
variables. Therefore, if information with respect to financial system stability is crucial
to the conduct of monetary policy, then firsthand information obtained through 
on-site bank examination can also be extremely important data for monetary policy
management, as Federal Reserve economists often argue.
30
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Table 5  Real GDP Growth Forecastability of Combined Indicators
Two quarters ahead Four quarters ahead Eight quarters ahead
1987–90 1991–94 1987–90 1991–94 1987–90 1991–94
Benchmark model (absolute RMSFE)
AR model 2.51 2.38 1.98 2.65 1.71 2.72 
Univariate forecast (relative MSFE)
RW model (1) 1.01 1.66 1.02 1.15 1.06 0.93
Bivariate forecast (relative MSFE)
Economic activities
Median 0.96 0.71 0.94 0.55 0.97 0.72
Trimmed mean (1) 0.95 0.68 0.93 0.56 0.89 0.68
Trimmed mean (2) 0.96 0.68 0.93 0.55 0.91 0.69
Prices, wages, and commodity prices
Median 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.99 1.01
Trimmed mean (1) 1.01 0.98 1.02 0.97 0.98 1.00
Trimmed mean (2) 1.01 0.99 1.01 0.98 0.98 1.01
Money
Median 0.87 0.39 0.94 0.22 0.96 0.42
Trimmed mean (1) 0.84 0.32 0.92 0.19 0.96 0.40
Trimmed mean (2) 0.86 0.36 0.93 0.21 0.97 0.43
Asset prices
Median 0.93 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.89
Trimmed mean (1) 0.97 0.68 0.79 0.49 0.70 0.64
Trimmed mean (2) 0.97 0.71 0.80 0.54 0.74 0.69
All variables
Median 0.96 0.68 0.95 0.60 0.96 0.74
Trimmed mean (1) 0.93 0.60 0.88 0.47 0.85 0.62
Trimmed mean (2) 0.93 0.61 0.89 0.49 0.87 0.64
Trimmed mean (6) 0.94 0.65 0.92 0.55 0.91 0.96
Notes: 1. RW models (1) conduct output growth forecasting by assuming that log differences of price
levels from one quarter ago follow a random walk pattern. 
2. Trimmed means (1), (2), and (6) compute the average after excluding the largest/smallest,
largest/smallest two, and largest/smallest three forecasts, respectively. 
30. For example, see Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999).V. Conclusions
In this paper, we have reviewed the process of the emergence, expansion, and 
bursting of Japan’s asset price bubble during the period from the latter half of 
the 1980s to date, from the viewpoint of monetary policy management. Preliminary
conclusions can be drawn as follows. 
First of all, Japan’s experience does not necessarily suggest that asset prices need to
be included in the targets of monetary policy. In this regard, the conclusion of
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) is correct. However, the assertion of Bernanke and
Gertler (1999), that a central bank can accomplish effectively and comprehensively
both macroeconomic stability and financial system stability by adopting a strategy of
“flexible inflation targeting” to commit to an inflation target in the long run, is not
automatically guaranteed.
A critical point is that the bubble period in Japan was based on excessively 
optimistic expectations with respect to the future, which might be described as
euphoria with the benefit of hindsight, rather than a rational bubble, as modeled 
by Blanchard and Watson (1982), which assume market participants accurately 
recognize the fundamentals. Under continued price stability, the perceived potential
output path shifted upward as economic expansion continued, resulting in the 
emergence of euphoria and underestimation of inflationary pressure in view of the
output gap. However, an increase in asset prices during this period also failed to
deliver a sufficient clue to assess whether such an increase was the consequence of an
advent of a new economy or just euphoria. After all, in light of Japan’s experiences, a
central bank cannot take an appropriate policy response without evaluating whether
expectations for a new stage of development induced by asset price hikes are euphoric
or not, and forecast a correct path for the potential growth rate. In this sense, it 
cannot reasonably be assumed that direct inclusion of asset prices in a policy target
could have led to a more appropriate policy judgment. 
In addition, Japan’s experience seems to suggest that it would be worth trying to
carry out early and drastic monetary easing when a bubble bursts. However, in the
case of Japan, the characteristic of a bank-based financial system, wherein the effects
of the bursting of the bubble on the financial front suddenly materialized at a stage
beyond a certain critical value, made it difficult for the central bank to recognize that
the shock of the bubble’s bursting would have a prolonged impact beyond the normal
business cycle at an early stage of the bursting. To this end, similar to the case during
the period of emergence and expansion of the bubble, the central bank cannot make
a policy judgment without evaluating to what extent the potential output path will
continue to shift downward by taking account of the effects of the bubble’s bursting
on the financial front.
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AND MONETARY POLICY
Appendix 1 reviews the relationship between the generation and bursting of Japan’s
bubble and so-called structural problems, and the implications for monetary policy
management.
The potential growth rate of Japan’s economy declined substantially in the 1990s.
In order to intuitively grasp the trend of the potential growth rate, Appendix Figure 1
shows, as a proxy for the potential growth rate, the logarithm level and growth rate of
HP-filtered trend of real GDP. These values are the same as those used in Section
III.A to calculate the output gap in verifying policy rules. From the figure, one can
see that the potential growth rate had risen to about 4.5 percent in the latter half 
of the 1980s but subsequently declined throughout the 1990s to some 0.2 percent 
by around 1999.
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Note: Figures for real GDP are 63SNA basis. The HP-filtered series is computed for
the period from 1955/II to 2000/IV by using smoothing parameter λ = 1,600.
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly; Cabinet Office,
National Accounts.Of course, the HP-filtered trend does not necessarily correspond to growth rates
as viable over the medium to long run. However, it would be true that when the
economy is facing various structural problems, growth rates which are viable in the
short run are substantially below the growth rate of true potential output.
A. Approach to Structural Problems
Then, what kind of structural problems did Japan’s economy confront in the 1990s?
Recognized as such problems are (1) the erosion of financial institutions’ balance
sheets resulting from the generation and bursting of the bubble, (2) inefficient 
non-tradable goods industries, (3) a corporate management system that is incom-
patible with change, and (4) a savings-investment imbalance (excess savings due to
demographic factors and other reasons).
31
The necessity and measures to cope with these four problems (except [1]) had
been recognized as early as the 1970s, but the emergence of asset price bubbles had
unfortunately worked in a way to temporarily disguise the problems. The inefficiency
of non-tradable goods industries and incompatibility of the corporate management
system with the changing environment were both hidden by the emergence of
euphoria and good corporate profits under the generation of asset price bubbles, and
the external imbalance stemming from the savings-investment imbalance seemed to
have temporarily disappeared.
Therefore, there was much procrastination as to how to deal with structural 
problems throughout the 1980s. In addition, in the early 1990s when the bubble
burst, people were trapped in an illusion based on the experience of asset price 
bubbles that all problems would be resolved once asset prices recovered. Furthermore,
in the latter half of the 1990s, there was some biased argument that the problem 
was solely attributable to the net capital erosion of firms and financial institutions
stemming from the bursting of asset price bubbles. 
B. Structural Problems, Asset Prices, and Monetary Policy
However, it should be noted that structural problems, once deferred by the 
emergence of the asset price bubble, materialized when the bubble burst. From this
viewpoint, an important issue regarding the structural problems would be that return
on equity (ROE) of firms centering on inefficient non-manufacturers had been low,
and therefore asset prices had not recovered, resulting in deferring resolution of the
balance-sheet problem.
In this context, it is necessary not only to resolve financial system problems in 
a narrow sense but also to pursue comprehensive structural reform to restore the
potential growth rate. Put differently, policy responses to asset price deflation should
be included in policy responses to escape from the current prolonged stagnation.
Under such economic conditions, structural rather than cyclical factors become 
crucial as fundamental reasons attributable to the current deflationary economic 
situation, and as a corresponding policy response, it becomes necessary not to 
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31. Maeda, Higo, and Nishizaki (2001) give more comprehensive analysis on structural problems. Unfortunately,
however, this paper is available only in Japanese.accumulate policies that offset cyclical factors but to pursue those that exclude 
structural factors. In this sense, monetary policy cannot be a panacea for economic
rehabilitation and cannot substitute for a policy that aims at resolving the 
structural problem on the supply side of the economy (Yamaguchi [1999b] and
Shirakawa [2000]).
As a monetary policy response to pursue structural reform, there is a view that
since an ultra-low interest rate policy makes it easy to defer the problem, interest rates
should be maintained at some high level in order not to give an incentive to postpone
the problem. However, since structural reform urges inefficient firms to exit from 
the market, there is the dilemma that nonperforming loans will increase during the
process of structural reform, thereby worsening economic conditions, at least in 
the short run. Therefore, in promoting structural reform, monetary policy should,
despite the above-mentioned problem of giving an incentive for forbearance, be 
pursued to realize effective monetary easing to mitigate the pain accompanying 
structural reform.
APPENDIX 2: THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN MONETARY 
AND PRUDENTIAL POLICIES
In Appendix 2, we summarize Japan’s experience with respect to a situation in which once
financial distress materializes, the boundary between monetary and prudential policies
becomes extremely ambiguous, based on the argument in Saito and Shiratsuka (2001). 
During the financial crises in 1997 and 1998, the serious liquidity constraint 
prevailing in the banking sector adversely affected the behavior of banks, as evidenced
by depressed loan activity, limited arbitraging, and poor market-making in financial
markets. As a consequence, arbitraging among various financial markets, including
short-term money and foreign exchange markets, were restricted, and financial markets
became segmented. Such a mechanism, whereby the behavior of liquidity-constrained
banks leads to illiquid financial markets, may carry several important implications for
monetary policy conducted by a central bank during financial crises.
32
A central bank usually attempts to control policy-targeted interest rates, for 
example, the uncollateralized overnight call rate in Japan, by guiding market partici-
pants’ expectations via daily open market operations. In a normal situation, once the
policy-targeted rate is set at a desirable level from the perspective of monetary policy, a
central bank expects the thus-determined policy-targeted rate to be transmitted to other
longer-term interest rates through arbitrage in the financial markets. During financial
crises, however, the above transmission mechanism is unlikely to work properly because
the behavior of financial institutions is severely restricted by a liquidity constraint.
Financially stressed banks tend to have serious difficulties not only with lending, but
also arbitraging and dealing in financial markets, thus hampering the transmission
mechanism from the policy-targeted rate to longer-term rates, resulting in market 
segmentation among various financial markets. 
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32. For details of theoretical and empirical analysis with respect to intensifying liquidity constraint and policy
responses by the BOJ during the financial crises in 1997 and 1998, see Saito and Shiratsuka (2001).Thus, it could be extremely important for a central bank to intervene in various
financial markets to fix segmented markets, thereby restoring market liquidity and the
proper interest rate transmission mechanism. The monetary operation motivated by the
above consideration may be rather different from that conducted in a normal situation.
That is, the monetary operation would require not only adjusting the aggregate amount
of liquidity in financial markets by increasing and lowering short-term interest rates, but
also fixing the allocation of liquidity among financial markets to reactivate the 
transmission mechanism from a policy-targeted rate to longer-term rates.
In this regard, the money market operations conducted by the BOJ since 1997
can be interpreted as being motivated by both the sufficient provision of liquidity
and the proper allocation of liquidity among segmented markets. First, during the
financial crisis from 1997 to 1998, as Saito and Shiratsuka (2001) point out, the BOJ
intervened in several money markets simultaneously to fix market segmentation. 
The BOJ implemented a “dual operation” to facilitate year-end and fiscal year-end
funding, that is, it injected longer-term funds while absorbing excess funds in the
overnight transactions (Appendix Figure 2). Second, with respect to the zero interest
rate policy conducted from February 1999 to August 2000, Fujiki and Shiratsuka
(2001) empirically show that the zero interest rate along with future commitment
had a powerful easing effect as a result of two factors. One is the effect on market
expectations regarding the future course of monetary policy actions, thereby 
flattening and stabilizing the yield curve at a very low level. The other is mitigating
the liquidity constraints of financial institutions, as witnessed by a significant 
reduction in term spreads.
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Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.These policy experiences suggest that it would be important to consider not 
only controlling the aggregate amount of liquidity, but also correcting the allocation
of liquidity during a financial crisis, thereby resolving market segmentation and 
restoring the interest arbitraging mechanism. It should be noted, however, that such
easing effects only mitigated the liquidity constraint of financial institutions and
failed to be transmitted outside the financial system, since the transmission channel
between financial and nonfinancial sectors was not functioning sufficiently. 
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